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A B S T R A C T
Energy systems are in transformation towards increasingly renewable, decentralised, demand responsive and
smart conﬁgurations. This has led to advocacy of the ‘prosumer’ phenomenon: characterised by actors who both
consume and produce renewable energy. In parallel a range of prosumer business models are emerging, gov-
erned by a range of market, municipal and community actors. Through a series of semi-structured interviews,
focus groups and documentary analysis - centred on a case study of Bristol in the UK - this paper critically
evaluates the normative dimensions of prosumer business models, modes of governance and understandings of
value. We discuss how competing ‘value logics’ are present within imagined futures of prosumer-ism, and
through a novel conceptual framework, how these modes of governance may lead to divergent material out-
comes in a decentralised energy transition. We argue that a more explicit recognition of competing theories of
value, agency and change is needed in future discussions of prosumer-ism.
1. Introduction
Energy transitions are typically characterised as transformations of
physical infrastructures, accompanied by wider social, organisational
and political changes [1]. There is a growing consensus that a sus-
tainable energy transition will involve increasingly decentralised sites
of energy production and self-consumption [2]. These physical changes
will integrate renewable electricity production and consumption close
to its point of generation (solar PV, small scale wind and hydro power),
low carbon heating systems (heat pumps, heat networks, and biomass)
as well as vehicle electriﬁcation and storage [3]. Optimising these
multi-vector systems and ensuring the reliable and eﬃcient provision of
energy services from intermittent renewables, will increasingly ne-
cessitate greater demand side ﬂexibility and control at a local and
household scale [4,5]. These features of distributed energy systems
(DES) are leading to a growing advocacy of the ‘prosumer’ phenom-
enon: characterised as actors who both produce and consume renew-
able energy, and actively modulate their consumption [6,7].
Alongside physical transformations, proponents of prosumersim and
DES often emphasise a range of social, institutional and organisational
changes that may accompany this transition. Firstly, these include a
greater role for civil society in the ownership, governance and direction
of energy transitions. The most prevalent example is the profusion of
‘community energy’ projects, especially in northern Europe [8–12].
These cases are often characterised by their small scale; with commu-
nity shareholders providing equity ﬁnance to develop projects that
deliver ‘local value’, above and beyond the provision of energy services
[13]. A parallel development has been the advocacy of municipal in-
volvement in the governance of DES [14]. These include emerging
municipal energy suppliers [15], ESCOs [16] and retroﬁt programs
[17]: often aiming to mitigate fuel poverty, health issues and dis-
tributional inequalities. A third strand involves an evolution of the
current centralised and vertically integrated energy suppliers towards a
greater role for technology ﬁrms, platform providers and aggregators
alongside energy suppliers [18]. In this vision, the market share of the
traditional energy utilities is captured by a range of challenger ﬁrms
who proﬁt from the provision of prosumer energy systems, ﬂexibility
services and emerging markets of heat and mobility service provision
[19]. These diﬀerent modes of governance are therefore seen to have
divergent social outcomes on the nature and direction of the prosumer
energy transition.
To capture these increasingly plural values, a range of new pro-
sumer business models are emerging. Recent studies have attempted to
characterise these new business models through typologies [20,21] and
quantify the potential ﬁnancial value that they create in future energy
systems: i.e. that which has direct monetary exchange value (electricity,
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heat) [22]. However, few studies have speciﬁcally interrogated the
governance dimensions of these business models or discussed their
normative purpose: i.e. non-ﬁnancial social and environmental values
(social cohesion, distributional equity, clean air) [15], which do not
have a monetary exchange value.
In this paper we explore these competing normative dimensions
through the lens of alternative conceptions of value. Developing a
conceptual framework for these ‘value logics’ [23] we explore these
ideas through three organisations looking to play a key role in a pro-
sumer led energy transition in Bristol in the UK. We compare the
governance of these organisations – each adopting market, municipal
and community modes – in terms of the theories of value, agency and
change upon which they are based. We further discuss how the pre-
vailing institutional context of the UK favours business models with
market based governance, narrowing the potential scope of economic,
social and environmental value that is delivered. Whilst this paper is
centred on the UK, we argue these ﬁndings have broader relevance for
the study of decentralised energy transitions, especially in the European
Union (EU).
In the following Section 2 we introduce four key ideas which
structure the theoretical development of the paper. Firstly, we in-
troduce the renewable energy prosumer concept (Section 2.1). We then
situate this within the notion of business models, before emphasising
alternative market, municipal and governance of business models
(Section 2.2). Thirdly, we develop a novel framework for the values and
value logics on which these alternative modes of governance are based
(Section 2.3). Section 3 introduces our research design and metho-
dology. In Section 4 we explore these ideas through three case studies of
market, municipal and community prosumer governance in the city of
Bristol. In Section 5 we discuss these ﬁndings in the context of the value
logics framework developed in Section 2.3, before providing conclu-
sions and recommendations for further research in Section 6.
2. Business models, governance and value in prosumer energy
systems
In this section we explore the relationship between prosumers and
three key concepts: business models, governance and value logics, devel-
oping a novel conceptual framework. We ﬁrst show how the prosumer
phenomenon necessitates new business models which deliver value and
capture revenue in ways that are radically diﬀerent for the current
centralised energy system [24]. These business models are situated in
diﬀerent types of organisation with diﬀerent modes of governance [25].
These modes of governance are in turn are motivated by diﬀerent value
logics, informed by divergent philosophical and ideological perspec-
tives [23], as shown in Fig. 1.
2.1. Prosumerism – what is it and what is it for?
The etymology of the ‘prosumer’ originates with Alvin Toﬄer's [26]
futurist treatise on the new global economy: characterised as the ‘third
wave’. In the book Toﬄer presciently foresaw the rise of the informa-
tion age, renewable energy, bio-technology and an increasingly post-
industrial society [27,28]. Of particular emphasis was the ‘rise of the
prosumer’: characterised by a breakdown in the delineation of producer
and consumer that arose during the industrial revolution. With the
emerging third wave, citizens become active producers of goods and
services rather than passive consumers – enabled by the major new
resource of the age: information [26]. The prosumer concept has since
garnered signiﬁcant academic attention with the rise of open source
software, 3D printing, maker spaces, citizen ﬁnance and DES [29,30].
Although there is some debate on the deﬁnition [6,31], we characterise
renewable energy prosumers as:
Actors who both produce and consume renewable energy and ac-
tively modulate their demand.
Building on this deﬁnition, and following Brown et al., [24] we
develop and use the following ‘terms of art’. Firstly ‘prosuming’ (verb)
as the act of production and self-consumption, and secondly ‘prosu-
merism’ (noun) describing the phenomenon itself. Thus, prosumers,
prosuming and prosumerism describe a material phenomenon which
may have associated social, economic and institutional characteristics.
Consequently, in Table 1 we delineate centralised, distributed and
prosumer electricity systems on the basis of their physical and en-
gineering features, acknowledging ongoing debates surrounding the
social, economic and institutional characteristics of these systems [32].
Prosumerism is increasingly seen as a solution to the challenges
facing energy systems. In this vision, prosumers drive the adoption of
DES, where energy is both produced and consumed locally – reducing
greenhouse gas emissions and ensuring local value creation [6,33].
Advocates emphasise the beneﬁts of energy ‘autarky’ where multiple
energy vectors of electricity, heating, transportation and useful work
can be sourced locally from solar, wind, geothermal, waste and bio-
genic sources in increasingly closed-loop, circular systems [34]. These
scenarios also envisage demand-side behavioural change through time-
of-use (TOU) tariﬀs, storage and ﬂexibility service provision, helping to
balance renewables’ intermittency [35–37].
To facilitate the transition towards de-centralised and prosumer led
energy systems, various authors have highlighted the importance of
new business models [20,38,39]. These models may facilitate increased
self-consumption of renewable energy, local trading of electricity, grid
stability and a shift to other energy vectors such as heat and transport
[24]. However, few have emphasised how such business models might
be governed and diﬀerent types of value that they deliver.
2.2. Prosumer governance and business models
Governance has become a fashionable term describing processes of
decision-making, agency and control, across multiple actors and levels
in society, and is thus deﬁned by Goldtau [40] as:
“the institutions, mechanisms and processes through which eco-
nomic, political and administrative authority is exercised”
Energy research in the social sciences is replete with studies of
global [41], multi-level [42] and polycentric energy governance [40].
Studies also explore the relationship between energy system govern-
ance and the nature and direction of energy transitions [43,44]. These
studies share an emphasis on institutions, incumbency and subsidiarity
Fig. 1. The relationship between, business models, governance and value lo-
gics.
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in the governance of energy systems, and highlight the challenges of the
prevailing neoliberal ideology for achieving sustainable energy transi-
tions [43,45].
Yet, despite assertions that governance transcends the realm of
public policy [40,43], the vast majority of these studies emphasise the
role of governments, regulation and politics - ignoring governance of
organisations that deliver energy services. Several studies do explore
how diﬀerent business models can deliver more plural forms of value in
energy transitions [15,20,23,46]. However, few explicitly recognise
corporate governance's role as the ‘custodian of the business model’
[47]. This is despite an emerging seam of literature on diﬀerent forms
of private sector, community and municipal ownership in low carbon
energy [9,16], housing [48] and transportation systems [49].
Here, we redress this imbalance, through an explicit focus on modes
of governance within emerging prosumer business models. Thus, the
emphasis on how business models create, deliver and capture value
[50] is supplemented by analysis of the governance of these processes
[21]. These features are seen to combine in a variety of ways, however
they can be broadly aggregated into three modes of governance, that
characterise the public, private and third sectors [51]. Thus, the fol-
lowing sections explore three modes in the context of prosumer busi-
ness models: market, municipal and community governance.
2.2.1. Market energy governance
Private ﬁrms continue to dominate liberalised energy markets.
Beginning in the UK in the late 1980s, and expanding to much of the
EU, the centralised system of generation, retail, transmission and dis-
tribution was sold to large private utilities, which are often vertically
integrated and operate in multiple countries. Scholars have since
highlighted how accompanying business models are poorly suited to
facilitating a low carbon and distributed energy transition [19,20,52] –
with an emphasis on selling increasing units of energy to sustain proﬁts
[53] and centralised forms of generation and supply [29]. Recently,
however, a number of challenger energy start-ups have emerged across
Western Europe, seeking to provide improved customer service,
alongside the integration of DES.
A key focus of these challenger ﬁrms is to oﬀer green and renewable
energy tariﬀs. More recently, companies such as OVO are developing
technology-based propositions based around smart meters, renewable
heat and electric vehicles [4]. A key rationale is to capture value from
the retail and leasing of energy technologies and new revenue streams
from prosumer ﬂexibility services to system operators, even at the do-
mestic level [54]. It is noteworthy that several large incumbent utilities
are developing capabilities in prosumer business models including
Centrica's Local Energy Market [55], with Eon developing TOU and
heat pump tariﬀs. Thus, confounding Richter's [52] assertion, that in-
cumbent utilities would resist developing prosumer-centric business
models.
However, the underlying corporate governance of these ﬁrms is
indistinguishable from the traditional utility model. Although most
started in private hands, the majority will have shares traded on the
stock market. Such ﬁrms are typically operated to maximise share-
holder value, proﬁtability and share price. Run by a chief executive(s)/
owner(s)/founder(s) these ﬁrms are typically beholden to their strategic
vision, whilst major investors appoint a board of directors with over-
sight on the direction and management. Advocates argue that privati-
sation of the electricity infrastructure has driven down costs for con-
sumers, reduced carbon emissions and facilitated innovation [56].
Thus, under this vision new ﬁrms with ‘disruptive’ business models,
can revolutionise the energy sector in a similar manner to other in-
dustries such as telecoms and digital technology [57]. Consequently, a
market-led prosumer transition involves the integration of multiple self-
optimising devices and the partnering between energy suppliers, tech-
nology companies and electric vehicle manufacturers – through private
sector ‘aggregator’ business models [58]. Sceptics of this vision high-
light issues of opaque pricing and proﬁteering from vulnerable con-
sumers [59], persistent high levels of fuel poverty [60] and under-
investment in network infrastructure [61], which characterise the
energy liberalisation era.
2.2.2. Municipal energy governance
A second trend is a renewed role of local government and munici-
palities in DES. Despite UK municipalities’ early role in power system
development, networks were centralised in the early 20th century,
nationalised in the 1940s and subsequently privatised in the 1980/90 s
[62] .1 Large centralised private utilities, have since come under
Table 1
Three levels of electricity system design.
System type Network level Description
Centralised Energy Systems
Thermal power stations, Hydro-dams, Oﬀshore wind farms.
High voltage transmission network
400–50kv.
Traditional model of large power plants connected to high voltage
transmission network. Consumption far from point of generation.
Allows for economies of scale in power system design.
Distributed Energy Systems
Solar farms, Wind turbines, Micro-hydro.
Low voltage distribution network
50–1kv.
Emerging model with smaller scale power plants connected to low
voltage distribution network, although still feeding directly into the
grid. Consumption close to generation, or within grid supply point.
Reduces the use of the transmission network and promotes local
consumption.
Prosumer Energy Systems
Building connected solar, CHP, Micro-wind, Pico-hydro.
Ultra-low voltage domestic/
commercial network 400–110v.
Emerging model with micro scale power plants connected directly to
buildings or demand site. Consumption at the point of generation
often ‘behind the meter’.
As above and promotes ﬂexibility on the demand side by actively
involving users in demand response and temporal shifting.
1 Many EU countries have followed this pattern, starting in the UK
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increasing criticism for their high proﬁts, prices and carbon emissions
[63], and the unsuitability of their business model for DES [19,52].
Recently, authors have highlighted a potential role for local govern-
ments in overcoming the issues of sustainability, aﬀordability and en-
ergy security [14]. In the UK a number of municipally owned energy
supply companies have emerged, such as Robin Hood in Nottingham
and Bristol Energy amongst others [64].
These companies purport to oﬀer better value for customers than
private sector competitors, through not-for-proﬁt models or the re-in-
vestment of proﬁts in local government projects [15]. Historically,
municipalities played a role in developing heat networks, especially for
public buildings [45]. Although, the majority of UK examples are fo-
cussed on energy supply [14], municipalities in Germany and Denmark
are increasingly involved in distribution and generation [65]. Fron-
trunner cities in the UK such as Nottingham, Bristol and London are
now developing prosumer business models including municipal ESCOs
[16], net-zero-energy retroﬁtting programs [21] and battery assisted
models on the consumer side of the metre [66].
Municipal energy companies has several distinguishing features
from the incumbent private utilities. They are usually owned or created
by local governments or city authorities, with a range of arms-length
and public-private partnerships typical [16]. These organisations - ef-
fectively organs of the state - are answerable to the democratic process
that created them: typically, local government councillors and mayors.
These processes of representative democracy are therefore seen to
provide citizens with oversight in the governance of energy systems
[62,67]. Proponents argue that their ability to borrow cheaply, inﬂu-
ence local planning and regulations and build on existing trusted re-
lationships within speciﬁc geographies – makes municipalities ideally
placed to facilitate a prosumer-led transition [14,45,62,68].
Advocacy for municipal energy is typically accompanied by a pro-
blematisation of the retreat of the state in the neoliberal era of the last
four decades [43,45]. Thus, arguments are often framed around the
essential public good nature of energy infrastructure [59] and the wider
purview of the state to address related issues such as fuel poverty, social
welfare and housing standards [20]. Critics of this re-municipalisation
highlight ineﬃciencies in state provision when compared to markets,
past failures of nationalised industries, as well as lack of experience in
these more commercially-orientated activities [69]. Indeed, concerns
around municipalities capacity to facilitate a decentralised energy
transition remain a major obstacle to their increased involvement [14].
2.2.3. Community energy governance
The recent emergence of DES has also been accompanied by a
growing interest in ‘community energy’. Community energy systems
can be broadly understood as those that are owned, used, operated or
ﬁnanced by willing citizens, thus circumventing the traditional organs
of the market or the state [70]. Since the introduction of feed-in-tariﬀs
(FITs) there has been an explosion of community energy company re-
gistrations; with several hundred in the UK [13] and several thousand
in Germany [10]. Although their contribution to overall power pro-
duction has been relatively modest – largely wind, solar and micro-
hydro – community energy schemes have captured signiﬁcant media
and public attention [9]. Several authors have highlighted community
energies’ role in legitimising discourses on renewable systems [71],
such as wind power in Germany [10].
Community energy governance has several important features that
shape associated business models, and their logics of value creation and
capture. Community energy companies tend to adopt legal forms often
grouped as ‘cooperative’ or ‘collective’ entities. In the UK this includes a
range of Community Beneﬁt Societies (BenComms), Community
Interest Companies (CICs), Co‐operative societies (Coops), Companies
Limited by Guarantee, or other charitable legal models [72]. These
legal forms are characterised by internal democracy based on one
member, one vote [13]. Although diﬀerent legal forms may have for-
proﬁt or not-for-proﬁt status, a common theme is the reinvestment of
revenues in local projects which deliver ‘community beneﬁts’ [11].
Community energy tends to be ﬁnanced through investment-based
crowdfunding [68], typically with equity owned by multiple share-
holders [10]. Historically, community energy models have relied on
generous FIT subsidies, although increasingly emphasise the need for
new revenue streams [24,73]. Indeed, the phase out of these subsidies
across EU member states, has led to a major decline in prosumer pro-
jects [7,31]. Therefore, community actors are increasingly interested in
new business models such as micro-grids, local energy companies and
peer-to-peer trading [58].
Critiques of community energy models highlight several issues re-
lating to their governance and normative aims. Studies emphasise the
potentially exclusionary nature of community energy ownership -
where only those with the right mix of social, cultural and economic
capital [74] tend to be involved, potentially exacerbating existing socio-
economic and spatial inequalities [75]. Further, community energy
could be argued to create a form of ‘energy parochialism’, as the
business models pursued tend to advocate self-suﬃciency, oﬀ-grid
living and energy autarky [34] often at the expense of the wider elec-
tricity network [55]. This has led some authors to question the as-
sumption that ‘community’ should be conﬂated with ‘benign’ [72].
Consequently, the preferred mode of governance is inextricably
linked to diﬀerent understandings of value and the wider political and
economic values which underly them. These normative debates thus go
to the heart of what prosumerism is and who it is for. In the following
section we develop a conceptual framework to explore the nature of
these ‘value logics’ and how they are applied to the governance of en-
ergy systems.
2.3. Values and value in prosumerism
Advocates of prosumerism not only envisage material changes to
infrastructures and practices, but also accompanying visions of social,
economic and institutional change. These include hopes for increasing
energy democracy in the planning, decision-making and operation of
DES [76–78]. These democratic goals are purported to deliver more just
outcomes in the form distributional equity, inclusivity and fairness
[79,80]. Further, distributed forms of ownership, ﬁnancing and revenue
sharing may facilitate local value retention, economic development and
reduced inequality [20,46,81]. Thus, ‘technology optimist’ [82] ad-
vocates of prosumerism, see these trends towards decentralisation and
citizen participation as part of a broader trend of localism, subsidiarity
and a breakdown of the old dichotomies of market and state in the
provision of public services [6,34,72] – thus echoing Toﬄer's [26]
original vision of a third wave of capitalist development.
Whilst these normative outcomes are evident in many emerging
examples of prosumer business models, we wish to caution against the
assumption that these outcomes can be assumed a priori [72]. We posit
that these normative outcomes are contingent on the types of institu-
tions that govern energy transitions [43,83], how their governance
implicates the business models adopted, and the logics of value creation
and capture that underly them [15]. In this section we make explicit
these normative dimensions, through Laasch's [23] conception of ‘value
logics’. We show how these logics implicitly underlie alternative modes
of governance, further exploring their philosophical antecedents to
understand how institutions shape, and in turn are shaped by social,
political and economic values [43,44].
2.3.1. Market value logic
The market value logic draws upon value assumptions from neo-
classical economics and marginal utility theory. The philosophical
antecedents of this logic lie with Adam Smith's assertion that rational
self-interested individuals operating in competitive markets will lead to
socially optimal outcomes [84]. Smith's ideas were later formalised into
mathematical models and axioms by early economists such as William
Stanley Jevons, during the ‘marginalist revolution’ [85]. Under this
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paradigm, agents show their preferences through market mechanisms
such that the marginal value/utility of goods or services is revealed by
prices. Although tempered by the welfare state and social democratic
tendencies of the post-war consensus, these ideas found renewed favour
through the neoclassical economics of von Hayek and Friedman from
the 1970s onwards [85]. This primacy of market mechanisms and
shareholder value [86], led to the predominance of the market logic in
the governance of public services, during the energy market liberal-
isations and privatisations of the 1980s/90 s [56].
Thus, it is this logic of eﬃcient competitive markets, the emphasis of
ﬁnancial and shareholder value and the characterisation of agents as
‘consumers’ which informs the market value logic of prosumerism. In this
vision, innovative market entrants, or Schumpeter's ‘new men’ [87], are
seen to disrupt existing energy markets through the introduction of new
products, services and business models. Here, prosumers are viewed as
adopters of new consumer goods and change only their purchasing
activity and consumption behaviour [6,88] in response to price signals
and hedonic self-interest [89]. Such a vision implies limited social
change and instead presents prosumerism as a technological transition
predicated on existing market structures and relationships between
consumers, energy markets and the state.
2.3.2. Municipal value logic
By contrast the municipal value logic has its roots within democratic
socialism and the more recent re-municipalisation movement. The
philosophical antecedents of the municipal paradigm are bound up with
Marxist critiques of capitalism [90], and its ability to deliver socially-
beneﬁcial outcomes [91]. Originating in the labour movement of the
later 19th and early 20th centuries, municipal provision of essential
public services, emerged in response to the stark inequalities experi-
enced during the belle epoch [92]. The provision of water, sanitation and
later electricity by municipal authorities was predicated on the ‘public
good’ nature of these services. Thus, through the socialisation of the
costs, social value could be maximised through universal provision –
regardless of individual means. Inﬂuenced by Keynes, these collecti-
vising tendencies led to the aggregation and nationalisation of key in-
dustries including energy during the 1940s and post-war period. Re-
cently, the trend towards a re-municipalisation of public infrastructure,
is captured in Mazzucato's [93] notion of an ‘entrepreneurial state’.
Although most prevalent in Germany and France, municipal authorities
have sought to take back control of various elements of essential in-
frastructure, including both energy supply and distribution [91]. Such
ideas are mirrored in a resurgent scholarly interest in institutionalist
critiques of capitalism and the neoliberal model of public service pro-
vision [43,44,94].
Consequently, municipal prosumerism has representative democ-
racy and distributive justice at its core, emphasising the social value
and the socialisation of its costs, alongside sovereignty of the citizen.
Here, prosumerism facilitates subsidiarity over energy planning and
decision-making by absorbing the governance of energy systems within
local democratic institutions [67,95]. The emphasis on social value
broadens the narrower focus on shareholder value and consumer
choice, to deliver wider objectives of public health, poverty alleviation
and local economic development [20,96]. The delivery of these out-
comes is therefore delegated by citizen prosumers to an elected au-
thority, who manage the transition to a more sustainable energy system
on their behalf. Clearly, the success and consent for this transition is
contingent both on the capabilities of, but also trust in, local democratic
institutions.
2.3.3. Community value logic
The community value logic has its origins both within the cooperative
and more recent ‘new age’ movements which emerged alongside 20th
century environmentalism. Early forms of civic participation during the
industrial revolution and Victorian cooperative movement were based
on the concept of one member one vote and the retention of surplus
economic value amongst workers [9]. Therefore, the antecedents of the
movement were similar to the origins of state-led socialism. However,
vacillations between free market capitalism and authoritarian soci-
alism, alongside a growing environmental awareness, led to a distinct
philosophical tradition emerging in the late 20th century. Thinkers such
as E.F. Schumacher criticised the centralising and dehumanising ten-
dencies of both corporations and state bureaucracies, and instead ad-
vocated smaller units of organisation and decision making in ‘Small is
Beautiful’ [97]. This distrust of governing elites and a desire to adopt
smaller and ﬂatter forms of organisation is observed in the experi-
mental communities which characterise the new age movement
[34,40]. The work of Elinor Ostrom on common pool resources [98],
has further argued that small ‘polycentric’ forms of governance have for
centuries been an eﬃcient means of managing these resources through
co-operation and trust-based relationships, breaking down the old di-
chotomies of market and state.
Such approaches therefore adopt a logic of direct democracy, local
and socially-mediated forms of value creation and the characterisation
of agents as active stakeholders. Unlike the more collectivising ten-
dencies of state-led systems, communitarian approaches emphasise the
sovereignty of small groups of individuals who form advocacy coali-
tions of the willing [77]. This emphasis on localism and community
agency, is contrasted by the individualism of the market-led paradigm,
and the homogenising paternalism of the more statist municipal para-
digm [99]. When viewing community prosumerism through this lens,
we observe a tendency towards autarky [34], with communities seeking
to ‘island’ themselves from wider systems of energy consumption and
production, dismantling hierarchical organisation. While these ‘social
enterprises’ hope to democratise energy systems, they often retain a
proﬁt-seeking motive in the form of community shareholding and
Table 2
Conceptual framework for three paradigms of prosumerism.
Market paradigm Municipal paradigm Community paradigm
Theory of
value
Value is determined by market prices and is
translated into shareholder value. Intangible values
are expressed in monetary terms or are ignored.
In addition to ﬁnancial value the state seeks to
facilitate intangible social value or ‘public goods’
such as public health, environmental and economic
development. Intangible value may not be
monetised, although policymakers develop
‘objective’ and universal understandings of
intangible value.
Value is derived from community beneﬁt. Whilst
this includes social value, these intangible values
are nested within speciﬁc attachments to
communities and an emphasis on local context and
are therefore treated subjectively.
Theory of
agency
Prosumers exercise sovereignty through purchasing
decisions and participation in prosumer energy
markets.
Through processes of representative democracy,
prosumers are able to exercise sovereignty as
citizens and voters.
Prosumers exercise sovereignty through direct and
participatory democracy. Prosumers are therefore
viewed as stakeholders.
Theory of
change
Utility maximising prosumers seek to optimise their
welfare in competitive markets through price
signals. Entrepreneurial ﬁrms respond to these
signals through new product and service oﬀerings.
Local governments direct change on behalf of
prosumers/users through democratic processes and
public bureaucracies. Citizens exercise preferences
through political parties and regular elections.
Proactive citizens form advocacy coalitions to
direct change through grassroots prosumer
initiatives. Change occurs locally and is
geographically and culturally contingent.
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dividends [10]. Therefore, this paradigm typically advocates a variant
of capitalism [100], rather than a radically new form of economic or-
ganisation [101].
These three overlapping value logics are depicted in Table 2. These
paradigms diﬀer in terms of their theory of change, the nature of the
value that is emphasised and how prosumers exercise agency within
these systems. While real-world examples are unlikely to conform to a
pure version of a particular paradigm, in the rest of this paper we ex-
plore how these competing normative dimensions are manifested in
diﬀerent forms of governance and in turn business models adopted by
market, municipal and community energy actors.
3. Methodology
To understand the relationships between governance, business
models and underlying value logics, a comparative case study research
design was adopted. The aim was to compare and contrast three types
of market, municipal and community energy actor, delineated by their
mode of governance. Thus, we categorised these groups a priori using
Creamer et al's [72] and Avelino and Wittmayer's [25] disaggregation
of market, municipal and community governance alongside Brown
et al's [24] typology of prosumer business models. Subsequently a
qualitative mixed methods approach explored how diﬀerent business
models create, deliver and capture value as well as normative under-
standings of value, agency and change within these respective organi-
sations. This research design was deemed appropriate given the ex-
ploratory and interpretive nature of the paper.
Case study data was centred on the city of Bristol, UK. This included
OVO Energy (market governance), Bristol Energy Company (municipal
governance) and Bristol Energy Cooperative (community governance).
Data included three stakeholder focus groups, eleven semi and un-
structured interviews as well as documentary analysis.
The semi-structured and unstructured interviews were conducted
from the winter of 2018 to the summer of 2019. Interviews were con-
centrated on prosumer organisations across the UK, between market,
municipal and community sectors. Interview questions were designed
to interrogate the nature of the business models adopted, how value is
created delivered and how revenue was captured. Particular emphasis
was placed on the three modes of governance outlined above, and how
this inﬂuenced: the type of value that was created, how prosumers could
exercise agency within the system and theories of how this change might
occur. A further three unstructured interviews were undertaken with
the OVO Energy, Bristol Energy Company and Bristol Energy
Cooperative. These interviews were designed unpack these normative
aims of the organisation, with particular reference to a new prosumer
business model each was developing. A full interview protocol and
interviewee list is provided in Appendices A and B.
The ﬁrst in a series of three focus groups (June 11th, 2019), ex-
plored the challenges and opportunities facing prosumerism in Bristol
in a post-subsidy landscape (32 attendees). These focus groups form
part of a series of ‘Living Lab’ interventions in the PROsumers in the
Energy Union (PROSEU) project. The events brought together a di-
versity of stakeholders including local government, community energy
organisations, businesses, citizens, academia and the third sector in-
cluding Bristol Energy Company, Bristol Energy Cooperative and OVO
Energy. Results of the ﬁrst workshop were then captured in a report and
disseminated to workshop participants [102]. A second roundtable
(November 21st, 2019) was centred on Bristol Energy Cooperative and
the challenges of developing business and ﬁnancing models for a pri-
vate wire micro-hydro project in the city (7 attendees). A third work-
shop (December 6th, 2019) was delivered jointly with Bristol Energy
Company and focussed on the challenges of developing domestic energy
service business models (25 attendees). Full details of these focus
groups is provided in Appendix A.
Subsequently, interviews were coded using the NVivo 12 qualitative
analysis software. Primary data analysis was complemented by a
number of academic and grey literature sources which helped both in
the conceptual development of the paper [6,13,14,103–105], as well as
providing further detail on the empirical case studies of the three Bristol
organisations [4,15,106,107].
4. Prosumer business models– exploring three modes of
governance
The following section sets out the ﬁndings from the three case
studies within the Bristol energy scene. We ﬁrst describe the nature and
history of the organisation, before providing an account of the novel
prosumer business model the organisation is pursuing. We focus spe-
ciﬁcally on how the governance of the organisation inﬂuenced the
preferred business model, alongside the prospects for the business
model within current institutional and market arrangements.
4.1. Market governance – OVO energy
Headquartered in Bristol, OVO energy were amongst the ﬁrst and
are now the largest of the 15 or so ‘challenger energy’ companies in the
UK. Founded by CEO Stephen Fitzpatrick in 2009, OVO now has ap-
proximately 1.5 m customers and is valued at ~£1bn (although its stock
is not traded publicly). OVO's modus operandi has been to increase its
market share through improved customer service and lower prices via a
range of transparent and ﬂexible tariﬀs. OVO are also heavily active in
the energy transition having acquired a number of energy technology
start-ups and are involved in public-funded trials surrounding smart
grids, electric vehicles and low carbon heat systems. Most saliently,
OVO also acquired VCharge – a ﬂexibility aggregator and platform
developer - in 2017. Now rebranded as ‘Kaluza’, this arm of OVO is
developing prosumer business models around the aggregation of ﬂex-
ible demand and generation assets (PV panels, heat pumps, home bat-
teries, EVs) or a ‘virtual power plant’ - delivering balancing and ﬂex-
ibility services to the electricity system, alongside technology retail
oﬀerings. OVO recently received £200 m in investment from the tech-
nology giant Mitsubishi, and as of September 2019 purchased Scottish
and Southern Electric's (SSE) retail arm – making them the second
largest energy supplier in the UK.
4.1.1. Business model: domestic aggregator
Domestic aggregator business models involve the direct load control
of ﬂexible demand and storage assets, complemented by local forms of
electricity generation, such as PV panels. Through network eﬀects and
control algorithms, aggregator platforms – such as Kaluza's – optimise
and control prosumers energy assets in real time. This is seen as a major
growth market for the ﬁrm in a distributed energy future:
“due to … increasing amounts of renewables on the grid we … saw [this]
huge opportunity in developing an aggregator in-house [with] this func-
tionality.” (Flexibility Service Provider #1).
“If we do crack this and do become… the ﬁrst player in this then there
are huge advantages to that” (Flexibility Service Provider #2)
These business models deliver signiﬁcant engineering value to the
electricity system by avoiding expensive and carbon intensive reserve
generation. Creating value for the wholesale, balancing and ancillary
markets, these models may therefore access signiﬁcant sources of new
revenue:
“all the opportunities and all the value that's created comes from value
available in the wholesale markets, inter-day spreads and the balance
markets… driven by… renewable output.” (Flexibility Service Provider
#2)
Key to accessing these value streams are network eﬀects, where a
large number of ﬂexible assets can be controlled and dispatched in real
time – often referred to as the virtual power plant concept. Therefore, in
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a similar manner to traditional energy retail models, these business
models necessitate aggregating a large number of customers, and an
emphasis on scale and market share:
“you have to build the scale … before you start to look at network value,
you can't do it the other way around. So [with]… more EV's… more
batteries… more connected heat propositions… you will start to see the
value unit go up because you can start to produce something meaningful”
(Flexibility Service Provider #2)
OVO intend to grow this customer base through “an integrated of-
fering… [involving] some hardware and a proposition around some other
beneﬁts and the value [from] the optimisation of their energy consumption.”
Therefore, these models retain the traditional relationships between
energy supplier and consumer and are largely consistent with the cur-
rent retail market design.
“a supplier [has] a customer relationship which allows us to try and sell
the devices that we want to connect through… those customer relation-
ships… act as almost a kind of a sales channel for us to acquire more
load.” (Flexibility Service Provider #2)
This market-led prosumerism therefore seeks to maximise ﬁnancial
value, primarily through the provision of services to the electricity
system as well as reduced costs and improved experience of customers.
Such value is easily capitalised in the share price and can lead to sig-
niﬁcant inward investment, such as a recent £200 m equity stake from
Mitsubishi [108]. The ﬁrm's strategy is therefore consistent with similar
high-growth ﬁrms in the technology sector:
”We have basically acquired a start-up kind of system, but we had the
money of a big company behind us.” (Flexibility Service Provider #1)
The long term goal is likely to be an initial public oﬀering (IPO) and
the continued maximisation of shareholder value. Despite their suc-
cesses and increasing scale, the interviewees conceded that the ﬁrm was
unlikely to invest in wider forms of social value, such as fuel poverty
alleviation, unless a clear business case could be made:
“Being a proﬁtable company has massive advantages in terms of our…
development but… it also limits you to do things that need to be proﬁt-
able… going forward.” (Flexibility Service Provider #1)
Although certain aspects of the UK's current electricity market
regulation are hindering the development of the business model, OVOs
corporate governance and proﬁt orientation are well supported by the
existing regulatory and institutional environment. This is likely to lead
to continued growth and increasing market share through a prosumer-
led oﬀering, operating within the bounds of the existing electricity
market structure. Consequently, the existing selection environment was
seen as largely favourable to the market governance of prosumerism.
4.2. Municipal governance – Bristol Energy Company
Bristol Energy are one of the UK's emerging municipally-owned
energy companies, alongside Robin Hood energy in Nottingham,
Cheshire East Council and several niche municipal ESCOs [14]. Like
OVO, Bristol Energy seek to challenge the UK's ‘big six’ energy com-
panies, although with an explicit focus on the city as its core customer
base. Indeed, as of August 2019 they have 100,000 customers – with the
majority based in a city of only 463,000 – a signiﬁcant market share.
Although localism has been core to the organisation's brand, their
stated aim is to address issues of fuel poverty and deprivation through a
focus on aﬀordability, home insulation programs and supporting vul-
nerable consumers. Although operating a for-proﬁt model, Bristol En-
ergy will recycle any proﬁts into the wider council's budget and must
also repay their initial £27 million start-up funding.
Bristol Energy have also been heavily involved in the cities’ low
carbon transition: oﬀering favourable power purchase agreements
(PPAs) to small renewable generators alongside a route for the councils
investment in low carbon infrastructure through Bristol's £1bn ‘City
Leap’ programme [106]: “so we are going to invest in [small scale hydro
scheme] because it's the right thing to do… using our… additionality
fund which comes from our green tariﬀ customers” (Municipal Energy
Company). Alongside these activities, Bristol Energy have been in-
volved in an innovative trial with the UK's Energy Systems Catapult to
develop an ‘energy-as-a-service’ business model. It is hoped than in time
this business model will develop into a full prosumer oﬀering, with low
carbon heating systems and solar panels oﬀered to customers on long-
term energy performance contracts. However, the current energy
system regulation and wider institutional norms are presenting chal-
lenges in moving beyond the trial stage.
4.2.1. Business model: energy-as-a-service
Energy service business models are predicated on selling customers
energy services (temperature/comfort, hot water, electricity) rather
than units of primary energy and conversion hardware (kWh of gas,
biomass and boilers, heat pumps and PV panels). These business models
instead transfer the responsibility for system eﬃciency onto energy
service companies (ESCOs). This creates economic incentives for max-
imum system eﬃciency, and the installation of insulation measures and
energy conversion systems with a low marginal cost of generation, such
as heat pumps and PV panels. These business models are often part-
nered with long-term ﬁnancing of measures and equipment and may
thus be oﬀered at no upfront cost to the customer.
Bristol Energy have expressed interest in this business model, spe-
ciﬁcally for its potential in overcoming the dual challenges of high
energy bills and climate change. During the current trial of the ‘heat-as-
a-service’ model, homeowners are oﬀered a ﬂat rate tariﬀ based on the
internal temperature of their home. Through a series of energy mon-
itoring devices, the trial aims to generate data on occupant behaviour
and heating system operation, for future reﬁnement of the oﬀering.
The long-term objective is to reduce household expenditure through
the energy eﬃciency retroﬁt of homes and the introduction of low
carbon heat sources and PV panels. Here the municipal ESCO oﬀers a
single tariﬀ based on agreed comfort levels and volumes of electricity
and hot water. This business model is already being trailed by another
municipal housing authority in Nottingham, as part of the
Energiesprong initiative. Here the focus has been on social housing,
with an improvement in occupant health and wellbeing having an equal
footing with energy savings:
“people living in cold draughty homes and with… high energy costs, there
being no [current] credible… solution to hit where we need to be in terms
of an 80% or greater CO2 reduction… I think as personal ambition that
keeps us kind of straight.” (ESCO Intermediary)
Therefore, these business models place greater emphasis on social
value, and the distributional beneﬁts of energy transitions. This is in no
small part due to the objectives of local authorities to facilitate social
value and public good objectives. Hence, Bristol Energy introduce
‘public sector values’ into an energy sector dominated by shareholder
owned multinationals. Additionally, a business model predicated on
improved comfort, health and wellbeing for vulnerable customers
alongside the adoption of DES through redistributive means, demon-
strates a distinct normative vision. Thus, municipal prosumerism is a
means of socialising the costs and beneﬁts of energy transitions to de-
liver more equitable and socially-just outcomes. Both the Energiesprong
and Bristol Energy examples have focussed on the social housing sector,
where social value can be maximised through business models which
involve the most vulnerable members of society – citizens who would
otherwise be excluded from becoming prosumers.
However, these municipal variants of prosumerism face signiﬁcant
challenges; both in terms of existing electricity market regulations and
the wider institutional context. Current UK electricity market regula-
tions give consumers the right to switch energy supplier within 28 days.
This requirement is signiﬁcant risk for business models predicated on a
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long-term energy service oﬀering, where the costs of measures and
fabric improvements are paid oﬀ gradually. Further, current state aid
requirements actually prevent Bristol Energy from acting as the pre-
ferred energy supplier for municipally-owned buildings and energy
assets in the city. Equally, unlike other EU states and the USA, muni-
cipal authorities in the UK face signiﬁcant restrictions on their ability to
borrow for infrastructure projects, hampering their entrepreneurial
ambitions.
Consequently, much of the existing energy market regulation and
wider institutional conditions present challenges for municipally-driven
variants of prosumerism. Alongside these structural issues, a range of
cultural factors also present challenges. Several of the workshop par-
ticipants, cited the £27 m funding for Bristol Energy as ‘a waste of
public money’, and used common tropes of the ‘inherent ineﬃciency
and wastefulness’ of the public sector. Although many other energy
start-ups remain unproﬁtable, the entrepreneurial and speculative ac-
tions of the city council were viewed by some as an inappropriate use of
council tax funds, despite the company exceeding its targets for cus-
tomer base in its ﬁrst few years:
“‘wasting the council's money… people have that opinion, it's not
something I hear a lot but… any time it's to do with ‘my taxes’ then
yeah everyone has an opinion… we are… very aware of where our
money comes from and we are all committed to making good on that
investment”
(Municipal Energy Company)
4.3. Community governance – Bristol Energy Coop
Bristol Energy Coop (BEC) are one of the larger actors that emerged
during the UK's community energy boom of the early-mid 2010s.
Formed in 2011, BEC have delivered almost £10.3 million of invest-
ment in community-owned solar schemes, including rooftop arrays on
community buildings in the city as well as some larger solar farms.
Governance of the Coop is based on a membership who make key de-
cisions and on the basis of ‘one member, one vote’. Historically, BECs
business model has been based on power purchase agreements (PPAs)
with the host site (often originally receiving the power for free),
alongside generous subsidy payments through the UK's FIT scheme.
BEC have raised funds through a series of community share oﬀerings,
where multiple small community investors can purchase shares through
the crowdfunding platform Ethex, with returns of 4–5% typical.
However, In April 2019 the UK government ended its FIT scheme
and also closed the export tariﬀ which guaranteed prices for exported
power. These policy changes have presented a major challenge to the
business model of community energy groups. Although the capital cost
of renewable energy has come down signiﬁcantly since the FITs were
introduced, long payback periods combined with uncertainties sur-
rounding the level of self-consumption has rendered many projects un-
economic. In response, community energy actors such as BEC have been
exploring new business models, which allow for greater self-consump-
tion of renewable generation ‘behind the meter’. Two related models
that are gaining increased interest are private wire and microgrid ar-
rangements.
4.4. Business model: private wire/microgrid
Private wire/microgrid business models share generation and sub-
sequent consumption behind the metre – eﬀectively limiting the use of
the public network. Private wire arrangements typically involve a single
generation asset, while microgrids involve multiple small nodes of
generation and consumption. What these models share is a privately-
owned distribution network and an emphasis on ‘islanding oﬀ’ prosu-
mers from the wider grid as far as possible.
BEC now have planning permission for a small micro-hydro scheme
at Netham Weir in the city, involving a 360 kW ‘Archimedes screw’
design and a private wire arrangement with a food storage warehouse.
Many other community energy actors are also expressing an interest in
developing microgrids on community housing schemes:
“We [were] just struggling to ﬁnd a model… because they've got 20
[electricty] meters and the housing Coop pays all the bills, so we don't
have to worry about billing. It's great because that's a big source of risk if
we were individually billing. That's where we want to do the microgrid”
(Community Energy Company #1)
The core value proposition of these business models is local value
retention, maximising revenues for the parties involved including the
community shareholders. Alongside ﬁnancial value, many community
energy companies have sought to redistribute surpluses to ‘worthy local
causes’ including fuel poverty programs and other community projects:
“I would say the motivation is diﬀerent. I think there's still a big focus on
getting renewable energy generation installed and combatting fuel pov-
erty. And then there's also the sustainable economy aspect” (Community
Energy Company #2)
Central to this understanding of value is the communities’ agency in
the decision-making process and an emphasis on building a grassroots
movement:
“I think a lot of the value in community energy is the social aspect of it,
whether that be increasing awareness of renewable energy or the edu-
cational aspect of having solar panels there for people to be able to see
ﬁrst-hand.” (Community Energy Company #2)
However, several interviewees highlighted the challenges of mea-
suring and therefore justifying these more intangible and speculative
forms of value:
“Yeah so this is really a discussion that is ongoing in the world of
community energy, how do you measure the performance of a commu-
nity energy group?... I think especially in terms of how policy's supporting
community energy there's a big mismatch in terms of valuing it socially
rather than purely based on the ﬁnancial incentives.” (Community
Energy Company #2)
Thus, traditional metrics used in policy analysis often fall short of
capturing the value that participants place on their agency in being
involved:
“everyone said something about democratising energy. Could they con-
dense it into an outcome? They all said something about diversifying
ownership and… enabling people to participate in a transition. It was a
shame because what I couldn't then do was say, 'Okay, well crystallise
that into something measurable for me please’.” (Community Energy
Company #1)
Community energy actors therefore place strong emphasis on direct
democracy, despite the challenges this brings in decision-making:
“they've got very good governance, but I think the problem is because it's
voluntary… meetings and stuﬀ take a long time to happen and it's almost
like, not by majority, but 100% sort of have got to sort of say, ‘Yeah,
we're up for it’.” (Microgrid Developer)
A key issue for these business models with their emphasis on self-
suﬃciency, is the extent to which they rely on, and therefore pay for,
the wider electricity system. Much of the microgrid concept is based on
avoiding use of system charges (UoS) which are currently charged vo-
lumetrically, contributing a signiﬁcant portion of energy bills:
“that's great because that then means that they can start to use storage
and generation to actually try to mitigate some of those charges”
(Microgrid Developer)
However, the UK's energy regulator Ofgem is currently reviewing
this and are minded to adopt ﬁxed UoS charges. Such moves relate to
concerns that as numbers of behind-the-metre prosumers increase,
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fewer and fewer non-prosumers will be paying for a larger and larger
share of these charges – the so called ‘death spiral eﬀect’. This high-
lights a wider philosophical debate on the extent to which prosumerism
represents a beneﬁt to a privileged few, with the social and ﬁnancial
capital to invest, at the expense of the wider energy bill paying public.
5. Discussion
This paper has outlined how three contrasting forms of market,
municipal and community governance, lead to diﬀerent outcomes for a
prosumer led energy transition. In turn, these competing visions of
prosumerism emphasise divergent forms of value, which are inherent in
the normative orientation of these modes of governance. Drawing on
our case study of Bristol, we now discuss these ﬁndings in the context of
the wider value logics upon which these alternative visions are based.
We further describe how the existing selection environment may favour
certain modes of governance foregrounding alternative theories of
value, agency and change. Our ﬁndings suggest that these competing
normative visions represent a ‘contested space’ for the future direction
of prosumerism, which has been under appreciated in the largely
technocratic scholarship of the phenomenon to date [7,37,109–112].
5.1. Theory of value
By applying a normative lens, this paper highlights what Laasch
[23] describes as plurality of ‘value logics’ which inform the market,
municipal and community paradigms of prosumerism. The case of OVO
and Kaluza highlights how the market paradigm views prosumerism
essentially as an extension of consumerism, with an emphasis on price
signals, consumer choice and shareholder value. Skeggs [113] outlines
how this primacy of capital and economic value has subsumed most
aspects of contemporary life. Sociologists and political economists thus
argue this logic intervenes in our intimate social relations [114,115],
controls our sense of time [116,117], and shapes our imagined futures
through complex relations of credit and debt [118–120]. In energy
transitions, this implies that responses to climate change, such as pro-
sumerism can be understood as a form of ‘market transition’ [121].
Framed in this way, prosumerism is a mechanism for energy suppliers
to oﬀer new products and services and an opportunity for investors to
increase proﬁts – perhaps with an intangible sense of having somehow
also done something ‘good’.
Our ﬁndings suggest that this conception of value remains dominant
in discussions of energy systems and extends to discourses on prosumer
futures. Thus, the market values of prosumerism are increasingly re-
ﬂected through the value that ﬁnancial markets place on actors such as
OVO – at a time when most energy suppliers have shrinking balance
sheets [122]. In this view, value is derived through the immaterial
activities of ﬁnancial markets, their platforms and instruments of ex-
change and circulation – what Davis [123] refers to as ‘speculative
value’. This speculative value privileges the intangibility of ‘the new’
and the excitement of ‘imagined futures’ over the material reality of
production and consumption [118,124] meaning that new and un-
proven companies are suddenly worth billions on global stock markets
[123,125,126]. As we argue above, the focus of market governance on
maximising shareholder value, and the anticipated future yield of
market opportunities, appears better for investors and increasing
market share than it does for achieving wider normative aims.
By contrast both Bristol Energy and BEC emphasise broader and
more intangible forms of social value, which are inherently subjective
and diﬃcult to quantify [127]. When reviewing these forms of muni-
cipal and community governance, our ﬁndings also suggest that con-
ceptions of social value are themselves contested [72]. Bristol Energy
espouse traditional public sector understandings of social value, sur-
rounding a ‘socialised’ and democratically-mediated response to issues
such as inequality, deprivation and climate change. Following Hall and
Foxon [46], municipal approaches therefore view social value as
something that can be deﬁned and addressed primarily thorough a
delegated authority, who emphasise the universal provision of essential
services and prioritise those most at need. These tendencies are sub-
sequently reﬂected in the selection of energy service business models
which ‘de-responsibilise’ the individual and instead seek to deliver
comfort, health and wellbeing instead of consumer products and energy
commodities [91,95].
Community energy actors also espouse social value objectives, al-
though tend to pursue value embedded within discrete geographical
locales or speciﬁc communities of interest. Thus, the adoption of micro-
grids and behind-the-metre forms of prosumerism reﬂects a more in-
dependent, anti-bureaucratic and libertarian set of values [34]. These
understandings thus giving primacy to locally-derived solutions and
local value creation and distribution. As outlined by Lent and Studdert
[99] this community value paradigm thus emerges from a distrust of the
amoral tendencies of markets and the homogenising and paternalistic
tendencies of the state. Critics of this position argue that this under-
standing of value tends towards parochialism and an exclusionary and
regressive means of governing energy transitions [75]. Thus, proﬁts and
control accrue to a new class of ‘prosumer capitalists’ who come from a
narrow demographic, age and ethnic groups.
5.2. Theory of agency
Market prosumerism sees prosumers exercise agency through their
purchasing power in liquid and competitive energy markets. Here,
domestic aggregators such as OVO/Kaluza develop novel product and
service oﬀerings, retaining the traditional supplier-consumer relation-
ship. This perspective characterises humans as proﬁt-maximising eco-
nomic agents, who express their preferences through purchasing deci-
sions – ‘voting with their feet’. Following marginal utility theory [85],
this concept of agency posits that prosumers improve their welfare
through competitive markets and product choice. However, evidence
from the energy liberalisation era challenges these assumptions, with
few consumers switching suppliers [128], resulting in oligopolistic
trading practices [56]. Whether these trends will continue a prosumer
transition remains to be seen. Notwithstanding, our ﬁndings suggest
markets are already placing a signiﬁcant speculative value on market
prosumer actors such as OVO.
Municipal variants of prosumerism, instead view prosumers as ‘ci-
tizens’ and foreground processes of representative democracy. Thus the
re-municipalisation movement, facilitates ‘energy democracy’ [76–78]
at the ballot box and Bergman and Eyre's [129] collectivised ideas of
‘energy citizenship’. Here, energy planning and the provision of energy
services is delegated to locally-accountable democratic institutions.
This leads to business models which place less emphasis on individual
choice and instead collectivise responsibility for delivering essential
energy services – through standardised oﬀerings with pre-determined
levels of comfort under long-term contracts [67]. Such models contra-
dict existing electricity market regulation, designed to promote
switching between suppliers [20] and represent a wider philosophical
departure from the logic of ‘markets know best’ which has characterised
the energy liberalisation era [94].
By contrast, community energy models emphasise direct democracy
and the sovereignty of individual communities of place and interest
[77]. This understanding of agency abandons centralised, hierarchical
governance, in favour of ‘polycentric’ forms. Drawing on these ideas,
Goldtau [40] argues that distributed and prosumer energy systems,
share many of the features of Ostrom's [98] ‘common pool resources’. In
this view prosumerism is best governed though locally-constituted and
independent networks of community participation. Here, local context
and subjective values can be best accommodated by small groups often
acting independently of each other [40]. This view, places self-suﬃ-
ciency and community values ahead of more holistic and uniform ‘so-
cietal solutions’ to social problems [72]. Such understandings of agency
manifest in the pursuit of business models such as oﬀ-grid, private wire
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and microgrid solutions, which pursue autarky, even at the expense of
wider energy system function.
5.3. Theory of change
The nascent prosumer transition represents an unprecedented
change to the material character of energy systems. Proponents hope
this will be accompanied by complementary social and institutional
changes. In this paper we argue that these changes cannot be implicitly
assumed to occur without concerted structural and political action.
Hence, the existing regulatory landscape and wider selection environ-
ment lead to ‘institutional isomorphism’ [130]; where energy regula-
tion, ﬁnancial institutions, state aid rules, cultural norms and industry
narratives act as a homogenising force; tending towards existing modes
of governance and understandings of value. Consequently, by com-
bining our discussions of value and agency we discuss these alternative
theories of change, and the extent to which they are likely to be suc-
cessful in the current institutional context of the UK.
Market led variants of prosumerism view change as occurring lar-
gely within the conﬁnes of existing energy market structures. Although
policymakers may facilitate this transition by ﬁxing ‘market failures’;
this vision of prosumerism is associated with limited social and political
upheaval in liberalised market economies. Transition is therefore lar-
gely delivered through Schumpeterian ‘creative destruction’ with ‘dis-
ruptive’ ﬁrms, replacing incumbents through ‘Darwinian’ competition
[131]. Such understandings are also present in contemporary literature
surrounding socio-technical transitions [76]. Here, social and institu-
tional changes surrounding distributed and prosumer energy transitions
are often characterised as facilitating technological innovation, rather
than something worth pursuing in their own right [132]. The ﬁndings
of this paper tentatively suggest that market-led variants of prosu-
merism are likely to be most successful in the existing selection en-
vironment.
Advocates of municipal prosumerism, instead foresee a transition
towards locally-governed and publicly-owned energy service provision;
requiring major structural and institutional changes to be realised.
These include a new role for municipal ESCOs [62], radical reform of
energy markets [45], and greater ﬁnancial and ﬁscal authority for local
authorities to overturn dominant neoliberal cultural norms [68]. As
argued by Mazzucato [93], tropes of the state as ineﬃcient, cumber-
some and un-innovative are perhaps the most pervasive impediment to
this ‘municipal socialism’. Thus, actors such as Bristol Energy are forced
to emulate the practices of conventional energy suppliers, despite their
social value objectives [20]. In time advocates hope that concepts such
as energy service models can begin to challenge the dominance of the
market paradigm. However, UK municipalities face signiﬁcant struc-
tural challenges in developing prosumer business models against an
ongoing backdrop of austerity and privatisation [45].
The community energy paradigm is perhaps the purest embodiment
of the ‘third wave’ of capitalist development as originally conceived in
Toﬄer's concept of the ‘prosumer’ [26]. Here, prosumers not only take
responsibility for the physical provision of energy services, but also
become central actors in the governance of energy transitions. Thus,
locally-contingent understandings of value and the sovereignty of small
groups of active stakeholders shape the nature and direction of such
transitions [40]. However, unlike the municipal paradigm which uti-
lises the existing organs of representative democracy, community en-
ergy initiatives are symptomatic of a wider mistrust in the eﬀectiveness
and transparency of public institutions [133]. Thus, as Creamer et al.
[72] argues, the value of community energy is predicated on the
‘community’ having the best interests of its polity at heart – despite the
lack of checks, balances and accountability which characterise the
traditional public sector. Sud et al. [133] critique this emerging reliance
on community-led solutions and ‘social enterprises’ as a means of sol-
ving social and environmental issues. They argue that the isomorphism
inherent in capitalist systems leads to tensions between espoused social
values and the demands of market forces, proﬁtability and shareholders
value. Indeed, our ﬁndings have outlined that the prosumer business
models being pursued by community stakeholders, may in fact destroy
value for the wider energy system, and disenfranchise vulnerable non-
prosumers [75].
6. Conclusion and recommendations for future research
This paper aimed to shed new light on the future role of prosumers,
highlighting how alternative forms of governance may lead to radically
diﬀerent outcomes for the nature and direction of energy transitions. In
doing so we develop a novel conceptual framework, linking the con-
cepts of value logics, governance and business models. Through a focus
on three alternative forms of governance, we highlight how market,
municipal and community variants of prosumerism exhibit diﬀerent
conceptions of value, understandings of agency and theories of change.
We argue that these normative dimensions – often ignored in con-
temporary scholarship on prosumerism – will play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the shape and character of future energy systems.
While the case of Bristol - a frontrunner city in the UK's energy
transition – is instructive, future studies should look to map these trends
across diﬀerent national or institutional contexts. Thus, the re-
presentativeness of arguments made here should be qualiﬁed by the
relatively small sample size, and narrow empirical focus. Equally, the
transferability of these ﬁndings for other national contexts, is de-
pendant not only on their electricity market characteristics, but also
their prevailing political economy. The UK as ﬁrst mover in electricity
market liberalisation has perhaps gone further than most in the ‘mar-
ketisation’ of its energy sector. Other countries with a more interven-
tionist state, or stronger communitarian traditions may follow a dif-
ferent trajectory to that being observed in this study. Either way, the
contemporary context presents an interesting moment to study of this
directionality [134] of an increasingly decentralised energy transition.
We subsequently posit a number of concluding arguments and re-
commendations for future research, which aim to stimulate further
research and debate in the emerging ﬁeld of energy prosumerism:
• Prosumers are likely to play a crucial and enabling role as energy
systems become increasingly renewable and decentralised. These
trends will be accentuated by the increased adoption of smart home
technologies, EVs and ﬂexible demand side assets.
• The nature of these prosumer futures are, however, likely to be
heavily shaped by the dominant mode of governance through which
this transition is delivered.
• Current UK energy market regulations, cultural norms and the wider
institutional context is likely to favour the dominant market gov-
ernance paradigm – where prosumerism essentially becomes an
extension of consumer choice.
• Market-led variants of prosumerism are therefore likely to focus on
value that can be easily monetised, while municipal and community
governance may foreground broader forms of social value and as-
sociated political and social change.
• A prosumer transition in which municipal and community actors are
to play a signiﬁcant role, will instead require wide-reaching cultural
and structural changes. However, these normative visions of pro-
sumerism are contested.
• These contested norms are reﬂected in the choice of diﬀerent busi-
ness models which market, municipal and community actors choose
to adopt. Further these business models are likely to foreground
alternative understandings of value, agency and processes of
change.
• Therefore, broader forms of social value and institutional change are
unlikely to occur without political and economic reforms that ex-
tend well beyond the purview of energy markets.
• Future scholarship should acknowledge these divergent value sys-
tems within the prosumer concept and place greater emphasis on the
D. Brown, et al. Energy Research & Social Science 66 (2020) 101475
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how these relate to the governance of energy transitions more
broadly.
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